



he 2010/11 UK foreign
aid budget is £7.8
billion, having risen from
£5.5 billion in 2008/09.
Every major political
party rhetorically backs
higher aid levels or, at the very least,
maintaining current levels. 
Yet opinion polls have registered some
concern as to whether aid brings value for
taxpayers’ money. There are fears that it
wastes money, buoys corrupt governments
without affecting the poor for whom it
was intended or even, in the current
economic climate, that it would be far
better spent at home. Since this comes
from a public that is unimpeachably
generous in the aftermath of natural
disasters, the scepticism seems reserved
for government-administered aid.
Even recipients of aid have expressed a
desire for assistance that has been better
thought through. Paul Kagame, the
president of Rwanda, has argued that
donors need not ‘just the heart for aid,
but the head’.
In this regard, it is refreshing to hear
the new international development
secretary, Andrew Mitchell, calling for
major change in how taxpayers’ money
will be spent on aid. His plan for a new
independent aid watchdog, which will
help ensure value for money, could be a
major step forward in the fight to end
extreme poverty.
But there is a litany of failed hope and
promises from our aid industry’s past. If
the new government is to succeed, they
will need to take resolute and sometimes
painful measures now, which change the
goals and, more importantly, the process
of providing aid.
Where UK aid is spent
Today the UK bilateral aid budget is
disbursed to a wide range of sectors and
projects in over 100 nations. Only a
fraction of this money goes to extremely
poor regions, and a fraction of that to
areas where we have clear scientific
evidence that it could help to reduce
poverty. 
There are numerous studies showing
that improved literacy and numeracy give
children better opportunities in adulthood.
We have also learned that it is possible
dramatically to reduce child deaths in
extremely poor regions through provision
of very basic and inexpensive health
services (Bryce et al, 2005). During the last
parliament, £4.2 billion, 35% of total
bilateral aid, went on health and
education.
According to the Bellagio Child
Survival Study Group, a collection of
international experts on public health and
the causes of child deaths, the annual UK
aid budget would be more than sufficient
to prevent six million child deaths each
year – thus ending most child mortality. At
current costs, the same money could be
used to provide annual primary school
education to 78 million children in
extremely poor regions, who would
otherwise grow up illiterate and missing
basic maths skills.
But aid is spent on many more
dubious, and successful, claimants. During
the last parliament, the UK spent £2.6
billion helping build ‘government and civil
society’ and £1.9 billion on ‘economic
aid’, which refers to items such as budget
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work betterassistance and infrastructure aimed at
supporting the overall economy.
These projects have laudable goals,
but there is little evidence to prove how,
and whether, they matter to long-term
development or poverty eradication. When
considered as rivals to projects saving lives
or educating children, where we do have
strong evidence of need and benefit, they
are hard to justify. 
When deciding how to invest aid
funds, portfolio theories of asset
management tell us that when comparing
two alternative investments, if one has
greater certainty of a similar return to
another, we should allocate most or even
all funds to the investments where we
have greater understanding of returns. If
we applied these theories to our aid
budget, we would need to reduce radically
many categories of programmes today.
The need for rigorous
assessment
In fact, however we define our objectives
with aid, we quickly face the significant
obstacle that current assessment practices
leave us with little idea of which projects
have worked and which have not.
A typical Department for International
Development (DFID) aid project provides
funds to a government, or through an
NGO, which then administers the project,
spends the funds and reports back on
outcomes. DFID does operate an internal
evaluation group that audits some
projects and concludes whether they were
successful or not. Results are summarised
in DFID reports, for example:
‘The successes of aid are visible.
Thanks to UK aid from DFID, in recent
years three million people have been
vaccinated against measles, over 100,000
teachers have been trained, clean water
has been provided to almost one million
people and 12 million people have been
assisted through food security
programmes.’
Note the exclusive focus on an
accounting of inputs, rather than on
impact measured in terms of
improvements in health or education or
other key outcomes. Input claims can
sound impressive, but experience shows
that, by themselves, they are not.
Teachers participating in training sessions
might – but do not necessarily – lead to
better-educated children.
Even the poorest regions in Africa
typically have some kind of school, and
they probably have a teacher assigned to
them. But the schools often do not
function. The reasons are numerous:
teacher salaries are too small or in arrears;
there are no books, desks, written
materials or classroom visual aids; parents
remove their children from school to work
and look after siblings; or the teacher
simply absconds because there is no
effective supervisory system in place. 
Meaningful assessment must rest on
outcomes not inputs, and for large aid
donors, such outcomes should be the
desired goals, not an intermediate step
along the way. For example, a reasonable
measurement of the value of teacher
training should be pupils’ subsequent
performance in school, rather than a head
count of training session participants.
Similarly, the round number of people
to whom ‘clean water has been provided’
or who ‘have been assisted through food
security’ is less interesting and valuable
than, for example, any resultant changes
in health, measured in disease prevalence,
morbidity or mortality. Are the ‘one
million’ and ‘12 million’ lives measurably
better or not? We should be asking and
answering this question with rigour and
specificity. 
The DFID assessment points to
something else. Specifically, vaccinations
are inexpensive, as are rudimentary
schools, so the lack of these generally
reflects deeper problems. Poor provision of
public services invariably indicates that
extremely poor people, almost by
definition, are politically weak. The best
services go to wealthier urban areas:
children in these areas grow up wealthier,
and they tend to benefit first and
foremost from economic growth.
So if we simply provide more funds to
government budgets, and provide specific
inputs such as the items listed above,
what makes us think that these have lead
to better conditions for the extremely
poor?
In short, to make aid more effective,
we need better evidence on what works
and what doesn’t, and a focus on end
goals instead of inputs. We should ask
DFID to set precise goals for outcomes,
such as improving the school performance
of children in specific rural villages or
reducing mortality rates in specified
regions or raising income opportunities.














but we should never lose sight of the end
goal and always make sure we can
measure it.
Only when goals are set clearly and
outcomes of projects are measured
rigorously against these goals will we have
meaningful data to begin to understand
the impact of what we are doing. It is
encouraging that DFID is increasingly
focusing on measuring effectiveness, as
are other agencies. But there is clearly far
to go in making an evidence-based
approach the exclusive or default one. 
Evidence on aid
effectiveness
These problems of aid allocation are not
unique to the UK. In fact, despite over
five decades of large international aid
programmes, it is very difficult to find
evidence that foreign aid has achieved
much in terms of reducing global poverty.
The nations that have achieved the
most poverty reduction over the last two
or three decades – India and China –
received very little aid relative to their size.
Cross-country studies have repeatedly
shown that nations that received
substantial aid fared no better at growing
or reducing indicators of extreme poverty
than nations that received little aid
(Boone, 1996; Easterly et al, 2004).
We can point to specific successes:
the global coverage of vaccines and the
eradication of smallpox are great
achievements. But these require little
money, and they hardly justify the $100
billion plus global aid budgets, let alone
the UK’s £7.8 billion annual aid budgets.
As DFID itself reports, despite five decades
of spending and efforts: ‘over one billion
people, most of them in sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia, still live and die in
appalling conditions.’
One study concludes that aid
ineffectiveness might be due to the
deleterious impact of aid on exchange
rates (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). As
with Dutch disease (where increased
revenues from natural resources drive up
a nation’s exchange rate), large foreign
inflows drive up domestic wages and
prices, so pricing nations out of export
markets. Others have argued that aid
generates rent-seeking and corruption,
which are harmful to growth.
These explanations need careful study,
but they do not prevent well thought out
aid from providing benefits. For example,
aid that serves to improve the productivity
of employees or increases the overall
ability of a population and nation to
compete might be channelled in ways
that avoid or offset corruption and
competitiveness issues.
Aid for extremely 
poor regions
During the next few decades, it is very
likely that many poor nations will
continue to grow more rapidly than
rich nations. Resource-rich Africa
will grow much wealthier as India
and China add what the International
Monetary Fund describes as the equivalent
of one new Europe to global GDP over the
coming decade. 
The growing wealth of many regions
in Africa and Asia should lead to
important changes in how aid is allocated.
Throughout the world, there will be
‘pockets of poverty’, where extreme
poverty persists even when economies are
improving. These will be found in nations
with civil war or regional instability, and in
areas where ethnically distinct or politically
weak populations can be ignored by
national governments.
Residents of these enduring pockets of
poverty will stand to gain the most from
aid. Two reasonable goals, with existing
good evidence backing their value, would
aim to make sure that the next generation
of children can grow up educated, and the
communities live with decent, basic
healthcare.
This would mean mapping out the
regions where we think poverty will
persist, and orienting aid, for example,
towards ‘permitting the 10 million people
in these communities to access basic
health and education.’ Or we could work
on income-generating programmes to
help residents of these regions out of
extreme poverty.
The approach could be a package of
measures combining steps to achieve
specific outcomes that can be quantified
and hence measured, for example: income
levels, numeracy/literacy test scores,
disease incidence, mortality rates, etc. The 















traditional and experimental treatments
without the benefit of testing and the data
it generates, which could have determined
which treatments actually worked, which
had no effect and which were actually
harmful. Similarly, today in our aid
budgets, we have a plethora of
‘treatments’, most of which sound
promising. But for most of them, there
have been no serious evaluations and we
thus have no idea what actually works. 
Over the past century, techniques were
honed to understand the real (as opposed
to merely apparent) effects of medical
treatments in both surrogate and human
populations. There has been some attempt
to apply these approaches by economists
and others interested in the impact of
specific ‘treatments’ used as aid. The
Poverty Action Lab at MIT has led the
implementation of such techniques in
economics.
For an aid programme, it can be simple
to introduce rigorous measurement similar
to that used in the field of medicine. We
first define our goals as specifically and
clearly as possible. Then we design a
programme that allows us to measure the
effect of the activities we undertake to
reach the goal.
The third essential element is an
independent, objective monitoring team
responsible for measuring outcomes. If the
same rigour in measuring effectiveness of
drugs and healthcare had been applied to
the aid industry, we would surely know
much more about what works and what
doesn’t today. 
There is a case for these methods
adopted from medical drug trials to be
used not only for research, but also for
measuring the impact of aid projects in
progress when it is feasible. The logic of
this is simple: while in the private sector
we can measure outcome by profits, with
foreign aid we need to find alternative
means of rigorously assessing outcomes.
Based on our own experimental work,
we believe it is both feasible and highly
valuable to introduce such techniques – or
techniques developed by economists and
epidemiologists which are nearly as
rigorous – to understand better whether
individual projects actually succeed.
Measuring outcomes, not
counting inputs
Together with the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the UK-
based charity Effective Intervention, CEP
has embarked on several aid projects in
India and Africa that aim to improve
children’s education and health in
extremely poor regions. In each case we
pick major outcome goals – such as
reducing child mortality rates or raising
child literacy rates – and then work with
local partners, clinicians, other relevant
experts and medical statisticians to design
projects that will achieve these goals at
reasonable cost. 
These projects are not research – our
goal is to improve education and health in
a manner that can be expanded across
much larger populations – but they have
been designed like medical trials: we have
randomised the initial allocation of services
to villages so that we can compare
outcomes across treatment and control
villages during the initial stages of the
project, before expanding if it is successful.
Randomisation across communities as
we roll out programmes, so that some
receive project assistance earlier than
others, allows us to isolate the effect of
our aid project so it is not confused with
the effects of other changes that may be
affecting the region. We have also created
independent monitoring teams, which
regularly visit households to collect
information on child mortality and test
children’s outcomes for literacy and
numeracy. This gives us a detailed
understanding of what is working and
what is not. 
Today our projects employ 1,300
people in India and Africa, and we are
providing services to approximately
500,000 people. On a monthly basis, we
provide antenatal care to 8,000 women,
and we provide drugs and basic services to
1,500 sick children. During this year, we
will be testing 15,000 children in India and
Africa for literacy and numeracy, as part of
a programme to understand current levels
and aim for improvements.
We could list many more figures, but
they do not tell us anything about success.
Our experience has made us fully aware of
all the pitfalls of counting mere inputs. In
our health projects in West Africa, we still
find alarmingly high numbers of child
deaths. This is despite intensive training
both for parents on diseases that cause
child deaths and for village health workers
on how to treat simple diseases, plus free
provision of medicines and twice monthly
visits by trained nurses.








We cannot honestly claim to have
achieved much at this stage. We are still
waiting for our independent research team
to assess results and comparisons with
control villages. But it is already clear that
the intensive nature of disease, and the
isolation of these communities, means that
more needs to be done, probably over
many years, to reach our objective of
lowering the level of child mortality. 
Our education projects have also
begun to yield critical information about
how to design aid if the objective is to
raise educational levels. We are completing
a national survey of literacy and numeracy
in remote regions of Guinea-Bissau ahead
of a major project to improve these
indicators.
The preliminary data are showing us
that while schools exist on paper, they
simply do not function. We find the same
in tribal regions of India where we work:
enrolment ratios are very high, but children
do not attend and therefore do not learn.
A whole generation of children is growing
up illiterate and innumerate. 
In Guinea-Bissau, the communities very
much want functioning schools, frequently
pooling resources to build a mud-brick
schoolroom and pay a teacher’s salary.
Virtually nothing more is provided by a
central government that prefers to devote
over 30% of its budget to the military.
Despite being one of the poorest regions
of the world, very little aid money reaches
Guinea-Bissau and when it does the
impact is just too small to make any
difference. 
Making aid more effective
We’ve argued that there is good reason to
think that aid can achieve a lot to reduce
extreme poverty, and the amounts that we
currently spend are more than enough to
make major inroads.
But today there is not enough evidence
to convince sceptical observers that aid
money achieves what it ought to, and
evidence from the past generally suggests
the bulk of our aid money has failed to do
much to achieve poverty reduction. This is
a failure that both taxpayers and the
intended recipients need to see change. 
The new government has an
opportunity, as President Kagame suggests,
to apply hard-headed thinking so as to
make aid more effective. We believe the
following policies would make sense with
this goal in mind:
  A multidisciplinary group should be
formed to determine what our goals for
aid should be for the next decade and
what specific evidence we have on how
we can achieve those goals. To
demonstrate the renewed focus on making
aid work and using taxpayers’ money only
when we can be confident it is spent well,
all new non-emergency aid projects should
be halted while this process is underway. 
  We must set clear goals and select and
design aid projects around them. Such
goals could be lofty – such as reducing
extreme poverty in a region of 10 million
people – but they need to be specific
enough to measure and monitor. During
the design stages of all aid projects, we
should plan how we will measure and
monitor the effects of what we do in 
the most rigorous manner feasible from
the start. 
  We need to generate an objective
mentality among our project staff,
especially the evaluation departments.
These need to look forward to learning
both the positive conclusions, and the
negative conclusions, that rigorous
measurement will teach us.
Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and chairman of
Effective Intervention (http://www.effint.org),







will do much to
reduce poverty
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